Does exist something as an unspoken rest of a discourse?
For reaching an answer, we should look at first about the possibility of existence of an unspoken rest of a sentence. There are cases when after someone states a proposition, there is a rest constituted by the things it pointed to. These have to be farther discussed or at least farther inquired till to the point that they may return as objects to be discussed.
For instance, if we recommend someone to drink water from a spring, we do not expect he will simply drink water, but, after he will do so, we represent him as being able to testify the fulfillment of the advice received through another statement, as ‘Yes, I did drink water’. There is less important if he really speaks loud this statement, or only thought of it, since the former spoken advice enclosed him in the set of deeds able to be spoken about. Or, we may say he acts in a linguistic fashion.
In other cases, a statement undertakes an unspoken rest. Especially, when it points to some things directly, as ‘There is a cat on the roof’. On this time, the things involved would exist in a linguistic way. They do so for both the speaker and his audience. Generally speaking, most of things exist in such a manner, since almost all of them existed at some point of time as parts of a spoken sentence.
Therefore, we may conclude that the unspoken rest of a sentence is always a speakable one.
If we look farther to the extended discourses which gather such kind of sentences, we may see them as expecting that the matters discussed to be speakable, too, even if they are not approached completely. The great themes of extended philosophical discourses as knowledge, human existence or morality are all expected to be accomplished in a linguistic manner by the things involved. Namely, all the moral problems that would appear after the reception of a moral discourse should be also treated in a linguistic way. All the concrete facts that come after a moral discourse should primarily be discussed, even there is not sure that they would be discussed according to that discourse or to another one.
The discourses that follow a theoretical strand suppose that the practical side will come at once with the confrontation with the things themselves. But such separarion between a theoretical and practical side as self-independent ways of considering the reality is just illusory, since the statements also involve a linguistic way of completing them through the experience of the things they refer to. All the domains for which we have philosophical discourses are also circubscribed to a linguisic way of apprehending them. It is sufficient to think that we have to solve a moral issue instead of a problem of living for changing the practical apprehension of life into a linguistic one. The overall presence of such a linguistic way of apprehending reality implies that it is a common way of human living itself.
Nonetheless, life interrupts the linguistic trend of life, whenever we are alone due to an existential condition, which precede by its presence our power of speaking. Here we meet love, death, anguish, etc.